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We prove that in the BB84 quantum cryptography protocol
Alice and Bob do not need to make random bases-choice for
each qubit: they can keep the same bases for entire blocks
of qubits. It suffices that the raw key consists of many such
qubit-blocks. The practical advantage of reducing the need
for random number is emphasized.
The security of quantum cryptography [1,2] is based
on two main ingredients. The first one is well known:
the celebrated no cloning theorem [3], or - equivalently
- Heisenberg uncertainty relations [4], or entanglement-
without-signaling [5]. The second ingredient is also an
absolute necessity, although often only mentioned im-
plicitly: truly random choices on both sides. Clearly,
quantum cryptography should use quantum randomness,
i.e. the only physical source of true randomness. But, in
practice this is a severe constrain, because a complete
protocol requires a huge amount of random numbers,
from Alice’s state choices to Bob’s basis choices and for
the random choices and random permutations needed for
error correction and privacy amplification.
In this note we prove that the rush for quantum ran-
dom numbers can be reduced during the quantum com-
munication phase of the protocol without impairing on
the security against individual attacks. The idea is the
following: Alice and Bob use the same basis for large
blocks of qubits (hence, here individual attacks refers to
attacks block-by-block). During sifting, if they happen
to have chosen different bases, the entire block is disre-
garded. For each block Alice and Bob make new and
independent random choices of bases. In the limit of
large blocks, this reduces the rate at which random bits
are needed by about one half [6]. At first sight, one may
think that this makes Eve’s life easier: she knows that
all the qubits within a block are coded in the same basis.
But we shall see that this is not the case: Eve’s opti-
mal attack provides her with no more Shannon informa-
tion, for a given error rate QBER, than in the usual case
where Alice and Bob make random base-choices for each
qubit. Consequently, provided the raw key consists of (in-
finitely) many blocks of qubits, the Csisza´r, and J. Ko¨rner
theorem [7] applies: if the mutual information Alice-Bob
is larger than either the mutual informations Eve-Alice
or Eve-Bob, then Alice and Bob can distil a secret key. In
practice the mentioned many blocks should be processed
together for error correction and privacy amplification;
hence the block size should not be too large, if not error
correction and privacy amplification consumes too much
time.
The proof that Eve can not take advantage of the fact
that all qubits within a block are coded in the same basis
(unknown to Eve) follows an argument given by Xiang-
Bin [8]. It runs by contradiction. Assume that, for a
given QBER, Eve can extract an averaged information I
per qubit of a block of length n ≥ 2. Then, Eve can ex-
tract at least as much information attacking each qubit
one by one. For this she prepares n − 1 pairs of qubits
in the singlet state. She keeps one qubit per singlet and
uses the others to simulate a n qubit block, see Fig. 1.
Once Alice and Bob announced the basis used for this
block, i.e. after sifting, Eve measures the kept qubits in
the announced basis, thus preparing effectively all the n
qubits of the simulated block in the same basis, as illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Hence, she can extract I information per
qubit from the simulated block, including I information
on the qubit sent by Alice.
This rather simple argument is of great practical value,
assuming that the result also holds against coherent at-
tacks (i.e. attacks on the qubits of all blocks). Indeed,
in realistic implementations [9] Alice sends out several
millions of qubits per second, and the trend is clearly to-
wards even higher rates. This implies megabits of quan-
tum random numbers, a difficult though not impossible
task. Reducing this factor by quasi one half, without
reducing the security, is clearly advantageous. For exam-
ple, in the Plug-&-Play configuration we do already send
blocks of qubits from Alice to Bob, in order to circumvent
Rayleigh backscattering [10].
The result presented in this note softens the random
number generation bottleneck.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Eve is assumed to have a quantum machine (repre-
sented by the unitary operator U) acting on blocks of
n qubits plus m ancillas. After the unitary interaction
Eve keeps her m ancillas. If Alice sends only one qubit
(or if Eve likes to attack the qubits one-by-one), Eve can
simulate a n-qubit block by adding to Alice’s qubit the
halfs of n − 1 singlets. After Alice and Bob announced
the basis, Eve measures the other halves of the singlets in
this basis, thus effectively preparing the simulated block
as n qubits all coded in the same basis.
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